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In Colombia’s decades-long armed conflict, between one-fourth to one-third of combatants are 
women.  This paper addresses the problem of reintegrating female combatants in Colombia’s 
violent conflict into civil society after they have left armed groups.  It argues that many 
transitional justice mechanisms rely on the notion that certain dichotomies exist between an era 
of conflict and a post-conflict era.  Reflecting on the experiences of female combatants, this 
paper exposes those dichotomies as inaccurate reflections of the realities of many individuals 
affected by conflict.  In doing so, it aims to synthesize contemporary feminist scholarly work on 
transitional justice with detailed research on gender in Colombia.  This paper traces the evolution 
of feminist thinking on transitional justice mechanisms: a first generation focused on developing 
international criminal law to recognize the special character of sex crimes against women; a 
second generation was concerned that women in post-conflict societies may not consider that 
sexual violence is the most serious harm that they suffer, when compared to the murder of their 
children or the destruction of their communities; and finally, a third generation of scholars now 
caution that women during conflicts often, paradoxically, experience greater autonomy and less 
domestic violence than the post-conflict status quo.  It then contributes to the existing feminist 
scholarship on transitional justice by examining the additional complication of women who may 
have suffered the horrors of conflict, but who have also been perpetrators of some of these 
horrors.  Utilizing detailed research on the experiences of both Colombian women and men, it 
critiques transitional justice approaches from a gender-oriented perspective, and seeks to imagine 
what a gender-inclusive strategy might look like in Colombia. 
 





Entre un cuarto y un tercio de los combatientes en el prolongado y violento conflicto armado en 
Colombia son mujeres. Este artículo aborda el problema de la reintegración de las mujeres 
combatientes en la sociedad civil después de que dejan los grupos armados. El documento 
sostiene que muchos mecanismos de justicia transicional dependen de la noción de que existen 
ciertas dicotomías entre una era de conflicto y otra de post-conflicto. En una reflexión sobre las 
experiencias de estas mujeres combatientes, este ensayo demuestra que  dichas dicotomías son 
un reflejo impreciso de las realidades de muchos individuos afectados por el conflicto. Al 
hacerlo, pretende sintetizar el trabajo académico feminista contemporáneo sobre justicia 
transicional con una investigación detallada sobre género en Colombia. Este artículo traza la 
evolución del pensamiento feminista sobre mecanismos de justicia transicional: una primera 
generación centrada en el desarrollo del derecho penal internacional para reconocer el carácter 
especial de los crímenes sexuales contra mujeres; una segunda generación preocupada del hecho 
de que a las mujeres en sociedades de post-conflicto no les parezca que la violencia sexual es lo 
                                                
1 Shana Tabak, Visiting Associate Professor of Clinical Law and Friedman Fellow, The George Washington 
University Law School, International Human Rights Clinic.  I first drafted this working paper under the supervision 
of Professor David Luban, to whom I am indebted for his encouragement and inspired scholarship.  I am also 
grateful to Georgetown University Law Center for sponsoring my participation at the conference “Taking Stock of 
Transitional Justice” at Oxford University, at which I presented an early version of this paper in June 2009.   
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peor que les puede pasar, si se compara con el asesinato de sus hijos o la destrucción de sus 
comunidades; y, finalmente, una tercera generación de académicos advierten ahora de manera 
paradójica que las mujeres a menudo experimentan una mayor autonomía y menos violencia 
doméstica durante los conflictos que en el status quo del post-conflicto. Este trabajo contribuye a 
la investigación feminista sobre justicia transicional al examinar las complicaciones adicionales 
que experimentan las mujeres que han padecido el horror del conflicto, pero que también han 
sido perpetradoras de parte de este horror. Utilizando una investigación detallada sobre las 
experiencias de mujeres y hombres colombianos, el texto critica los enfoques de la justicia 
transicional desde una perspectiva de género y pretende imaginar cómo sería una estrategia de 
inclusión de género en Colombia. 
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A British freelance journalist has come to Colombia to cover the forty-year long civil war there, 
and falls in love with a local twenty-something woman named Lorena.  He moves into her 
family’s home in a rural town near the Ecuadorian border, and it becomes his base for covering 
the conflict.  Lorena is secretive about her life, but after months pass, eventually reveals that she 
is a member of the paramilitaries. She claims to have joined because she came from a poor 
family and felt she had no other option.  Friends warn the journalist that his girlfriend is one of 
the most feared assassins the “paras,” but he knows how difficult her life has been and refuses to 
believe them.  Finally he confronts Lorena one evening as she cleans her pistol. She admits that 
the paramilitaries have paid her to assassinate twenty-three people.  Soon after her confession, 
Lorena herself is murdered in a vengeance killing, leaving a 5-year old daughter to be cared for 
by her grandmother.2   
 
 Stories such as Lorena’s are printed daily in the pages of Colombia’s newspapers.  They 
appear side-by-side with reports describing the crimes of some of the worst human rights 
offenders being tried under Colombia’s Peace and Justice Law – one of the country’s efforts to 
implement a strategy of transitional justice to achieve accountability for past human rights 
violations.  In Colombia’s armed conflict, women have been victims of horrendous human rights 
violations.  But women are not strictly victims in Colombia’s conflict.  Women like Lorena, who 
is doubtlessly a perpetrator of violence, play an active role in the conflict.  Many women who 
join armed groups have previously been victims of sexual abuse, rape, or have suffered from a 
lack of educational and social opportunity.  Can an individual have her rights vindicated as a 
victim, yet also be held accountable for the human rights violations she has committed as a 
perpetrator?    
 In Colombia it is estimated that over one out of every four combatants is female.3  It is a 
conflict in which some political violence is highly sexualized, and in which women’s bodies 
become both targets of violence and also weapons of violence.  The situation in Colombia 
challenges transitional justice mechanisms and human rights law to grapple with complexity of 
the roles that women play in violent conflicts.  Even more importantly, however, the challenges 
of incorporating female combatants into a transitional justice strategy reveal important truths 
about the role that gender plays in conflict for both men and women.  These truths can be 
instructive in helping to conceptualize the role that gender and societal norms can play within 
violent conflicts throughout the world.  
 In this paper, I argue that transitional justice and human rights mechanisms, despite the 
superficial respect and the attention paid to women’s groups and women’s needs, fail to reach 
true gender inclusiveness because they neglect to consider the multiple gendered roles that both 
men and women play in conflict and post-conflict.   Furthermore, I claim that if scholars and 
practitioners examine transitional justice from a gendered lens, this perspective reveals not only 
crucial issues regarding the situation of women in conflict, but sparks essential questions about 
conflict in society in general that is instrumental to broader conversations about transitional 
                                                
2 La Semana, Amor asesino, March 20, 2008, (Author’s translation) 
http://www.semana.com/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?IdArt=110374. 
3 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, COLOMBIA: SCARRED BODIES, HIDDEN CRIMES, SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
IN THE ARMED CONFLICT, October 13, 2004, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR23/040/2004. 
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justice.  In this paper I briefly examines several post-conflict mechanisms in the context of 
Colombia, but I focus primarily on the theoretical importance of making this inquiry, the dangers 
of neglecting it, and the conclusion that examining closely the challenges in gender and 
transitional justice has the potential to teach us about and indeed, perhaps prevent, violent 
conflict.   
 Specific protection of women’s rights has emerged as a prime focus of feminist activism 
and scholarship in the late twentieth century.4  This strategy has proven to be an important one in 
addressing particular components of women’s experiences during conflict.   Yet one of the 
repercussions of having achieved broad-based recognition of women’s rights has been the 
development of transitional justice and human rights mechanisms in which women are 
perpetually perceived and treated as “the victim.”  This tendency oversimplifies the multiple 
roles played by women and men in conflict.  A human rights and transitional justice paradigm 
that encompasses the diverse experiences of actors and victims demands reframing transitional 
justice so that it is compatible with a gender-oriented critique.    
 Section I of this essay introduces the concept of transitional justice as a mechanism of 
accountability for human rights violations.  Section II outlines three progressive approaches to 
feminist critique of transitional justice initiatives.  It then examines in detail the most recent body 
of critical feminist scholarship and highlights some of the gender biases found in mainstream 
approaches transitional justice.  Section III provides a brief overview of the Colombian conflict, 
and of female combatants there. It then explores how the theories elaborated upon in Section II 
may or may not apply to the situation of these women.  Section IV briefly reviews the Peace and 
Justice Law, the predominant mechanism of the transitional justice mechanisms in Colombia, 
with regard to the experience of these women.  Rather than present an exhaustive review of 
transitional justice mechanisms in the country, this paper will focus only particular elements of 
this law that have special resonance in the lives of women combatants. And Section V, 
recognizing that the endeavor of transitional justice is necessarily an imperfect science, imagines 
what a gender-inclusive strategy might look like in Colombia.  
 
I. Transitional Justice  
 As countries emerge from years of human rights abuse and violent conflict, they often 
struggle to develop methods to reconcile society and to address the legacy of heinous acts that 
have taken place within their borders.  These efforts, understood broadly as transitional justice, 
are concerned with reordering society to promote a more just, less repressive society that seeks to 
overcome past trauma, and to account for past injustice.5  This process often, but not always, is 
implemented as a country shifts from an authoritarian regime to one based on liberal notions of 
democracy and pluralism.  These mechanisms include judicial and non-judicial options, 
including: truth and reconciliation commissions, prosecutions (international or domestic), victim 
reparations, vetting or lustration (banning perpetrators from public office), or amnesty (either 
blanket or individualized).   In addition to these practices, reliance has grown over recent 
decades on the practice of reconstruction, specifically through the disarmament, demobilization 
                                                
4 MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 165-198 (1998). 
5 LOUIS BICKFORD, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 3 1045–7, 
(2004) (explaining that ‘Transitional Justice refers to a field of activity and inquiry focused on how societies address 
legacies of past human rights abuses, mass atrocity, or other forms of severe social trauma, including genocide or 
civil war, in order to build a more democratic, just or peaceful future’). 
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and reintegration of combatants or “DDR” processes.  Most scholars distinguish DDR from 
Transitional Justice, and view the two as separate processes.  The former is concerned primarily 
with former combatants, is implemented during or immediately after conflict, and is concerned 
with security alone, whereas the later incorporates wider spectrum of individuals, may take years 
to implement after conflict, and is concerned with accountability, truth-seeking and redress for 
past wrongs.6  Despite these differences, both processes are oriented toward long-term objectives 
of reconciliation, stability and peace, and increasing numbers of scholars and practitioners argue 
that the two processes must be implemented in coordination.7  Because of its current and future 
relevance within the Colombian process, this paper addresses DDR as well as other transitional 
justice mechanisms.  
  The origins of the modern era of transitional justice are commonly traced to the 
Nuremburg trials, although history provides numerous examples of countries reckoning with 
corrupt regimes prior to World War II through means that also qualify as transitional justice.8  A 
central tenet of most transitional justice mechanisms is that they are implemented during a finite 
period spanning two subsequent governments,9 as a country transitions from one regime to 
another.  They are largely born out of necessity and implemented with a sense of urgency.  
Leaders and populations of post-conflict governments sense acutely that there will be an intense 
and painful recovery period, and must make difficult decisions about what the best route forward 
is for victims and perpetrators of abuse.   
 
II. Examining Transitional Justice with a Gendered Lens 
 The field of transitional justice has remained largely sequestered from feminist critique 
that has been influential in shaping the fields of human rights and international law.10  This may 
be due to the newness of the field, or to the urgency with which transitional justice mechanisms 
are typically implemented.  Nonetheless, within the past decade, several scholars have begun to 
stress the importance of evaluating transitional justice from a gender-conscious theoretical 
perspective.11  Application of a gender critique does not necessarily imply a focus on women’s 
unique needs, protection of women’s rights, or increased participation in a post-conflict setting.  
                                                
6 UN DDR and Transitional Justice 6.20, Level 6 Linkages with other Processes, available at: 
http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/06/20.php  
7 For a representative sampling of this perspective, see Ibid; Kimberly Theidon, Transitional Subjects: The 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia, INT’L. J, TRANSITIONAL JUST. 
66 (2007); Sergio Jaramillo, Yaneth Giha and Paula Torres, THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE, Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Colombia, June 2009, available at: 
http://www.ictj.org/en/research/projects/ddr/country-cases/2379.html  
8 Ruti Tietel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 69-70 (2003). 
9 RUTI TIETEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, 2000.  It should be noted that the conflict in Colombia takes a different 
shape; there has been no transition from one abusive regime to a second regime seeking accountability.  I adopt a 
broader interpretation of what the term “transitional justice” implies, which includes not only regime transition but 
also efforts by a government, such as Colombia’s, to seek accountability for past and ongoing violence.  
10 Vasuki Nesiah, Discussion Lines on Gender and Transitional Justice: An Introductory Essay Reflecting on the 
ICTJ Bellagion Workshop on Gender and Transitional Justice, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 799, 801-802 (2006). 
11 The International Center on Transitional Justice convened a conference on this topic in 2005 in Bellagio, Italy and 
published a collection of essays based on these meetings. See Christine Bell & Catherine O’Rourke, Does Feminism 
need a Theory of Transitional Justice? An Introductory Essay, INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 23 (2007); see also 
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Political Violence and Gender During Times of Transition, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 829 
(2006).  
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Instead, theorists who prefer an analysis that is more gender-aware frequently criticize these 
emphases.  
 An examination of the theoretical intersections between gender theory and transitional 
justice reveals three approaches.  The first approach is a non-feminist one; it makes no explicit 
acknowledgment of issues that uniquely affect women and men, neither does it recognize gender 
arrangements that exist in society.  This category is typified by a reliance on civil and political 
rights.  For example, a non-feminist approach might treat a victim of torture identically whether 
he is a man who has been electro-shocked during his imprisonment, or a woman who has 
suffered rape or sexual enslavement as part of her imprisonment.12  Or, if a guerilla group 
commits a massacre of civilians, this approach would call for equal attention to all those who had 
been harmed, meaning people who had been injured, killed, or had property destroyed.  
 A second approach to transitional justice is one that is explicitly feminist, and as such, 
criticizes a lack of attention within the field of transitional justice to the specific needs of 
women.  This feminist critique is particularly concerned with the lack of attention paid to sexual 
violence within conflict.  This approach maintains prominence of the civil and political scheme 
and transposes it onto the crimes that most affect women.  In the examples offered above, this 
approach would understand the female victim’s abuse in prison as explicitly gender-related, and 
categorize the crime as such in legal terms.  With regard to the civilian massacre, this second 
approach would highlight women who had suffered rape or sexual violence and would categorize 
those crimes as violations of human rights targeted against women.   
 A third school of thought has emerged that exposes the limitations of mainstream civil 
and political approaches to transitional justice and highlights the gender biases in many dominant 
discourses.  Throughout this paper I refer to this emerging body of scholarship as the gender-
oriented approach to transitional justice.  These gender-oriented theorists examine how conflict 
affects both men and women, consider how gender stereotypes and expectations for both men 
and women contribute to conflict, and how prevalent transitional justice mechanisms may be 
implemented to the ultimate detriment of women.13  This theoretical approach also attempts to 
complicate how the notion of truth is conceptualized,14 the presumption of “women as 
victims,”15 and the impact of gender on men.16  
 This paper is primarily concerned with understanding how this most recent gender-
oriented approach toward transitional justice might apply to a subject that has not yet been 
explicitly contemplated by these theorists: the situation of female combatants.  The existence of 
female combatants in conflicts worldwide is a phenomenon that is under-documented and under-
analyzed.  Consequently, it poses unique challenges for transitional justice and human rights 
mechanisms’ treatment of gender issues.  In addition, in grappling with the complicated role that 
female combatants play within and after conflict, the very nature of conflict and its intersection 
with gender constructs may indeed require reconsideration.  
                                                
12 Men are also victims of sexual abuse, yet this approach would not consider the explicitly sexual nature of the 
crimes of rape or sexual enslavement of either men or women.  
13 Elish Rooney, Engendering transitional justice: Quesitons of Absence and Silence, INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST, 
173 (2007). 
14 Fionnula Ní Aoláin & Catherine Turner, Gender, Truth and Transition, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 229 (2007).  
15 Naomi R. Cahn, Women in Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dilemmas and Directions, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN 
& L. 335 (2006). 
16 Brandon Hamber, Masculinity and Transitional Justice: An Exploratory Essay, INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 376 
(2007). 
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 A gender-oriented critique of transitional justice reveals numerous important problems 
that can arise if the transition to post-conflict is not done with an eye toward gender implications.  
These criticisms converge around three central themes, each of which I classify as “false 
dichotomies” inherent in the approach of many transitional justice programs.  I will further 
examine three of these dichotomies below, each of which presents unique challenges if they are 
to be overcome in the endeavor of implementing transitional justice: (A) the false dichotomy 
between the “pre” conflict era, and the “post” conflict era; (B) the public / private dichotomy that 
may be transposed onto transitional justice mechanisms and be perpetuated by them; and (C) the 
dichotomy between victims and perpetrators within and after conflict. 
 Each of these themes is explored here because they provide critical backdrop of general 
concerns regarding gender and transitional justice.  This backdrop provides a useful starting 
point for a more focused examination of the applicability of these theories to the experience of 
women in combat generally, and in Colombia specifically.    
 
A) False Dichotomy between the “Pre” and the “Post” Conflict 
 A central theme that unites many feminist critics is unease with the concept of bifurcation 
inherent within many transitional justice schemes.  This unease is captured by a provocative 
question: what exactly is transitional justice is transitioning “from,” and what it is transitioning 
“to”?17  Inherent in the word “transition” is the implication of a shift from a male-defined 
political violence to a liberal democratic framework.18  If women’s rights are abused during 
conflict, mainstream transitional justice may seek accountability and retribution for the male 
actors who violated women’s rights.  Yet, without an examination of core gender relationships, 
these mechanisms may simply reassert and cement the male-oriented relationships that lead to 
the conflict in the first place.19  War is oftentimes compartmentalized into two discrete phases, 
yet this division does not accurately reflect that underlying social continuums of violence and 
gender roles may exist on a continuum running through society.  Vasuki Nesiah argues that the 
temptation to draw a clean line between the pre-conflict and the post-conflict must be overcome; 
it is false to believe that either women or men experience the pre and post as a sharp binary 
opposition.20   
One consequence of reconceptualizing war outside of the boxes of pre and post also 
demands that scholars revisit the distinction between the “front line” that affects soldiers, and the 
“homefront” in which civilians reside.21  Increasingly, wars take place not only on a battlefield, 
but permeate into the hearts of communities, transforming the lives of soldiers and civilians 
alike.  Yet the concept of a “front line” where war occurs persists, as does the concept that 
soldiers are the primary actors. These misconceptions are apparent in the overly generalized and 
stereotypical way in which men’s and women’s roles are often portrayed in discussions of war 
and peace. 
                                                
17 Bell & O’Rourke supra note 11. See also Chris Coulter, BUSH WIVES AND GIRL SOLDIERS: WOMEN’S LIVES 
THROUGH WAR AND PEACE IN SIERRA LEONE, 2009.  Coulter indicates that women’s experiences during conflict can 
often serve as a powerful reminder that war and peace are not mutually exclusive, and that it is never entirely clear 
where one begins and the other ends.  (p. 7-8). 
18 Id. 
19 Ní Aoláin supra note 11.  
20 Nesiah supra note 10.   
21 Anthropological research focused on war and conflict has reached the consensus that it is not accurate to speak of 
a front line in war that affects only professional armies.  See generally Coulter, supra note 17.  
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 A deeper layer of this critique chips away further at the transitional dichotomy of pre-and 
post.  Despite the political end of a conflict, women may perceive their situations to worsen after 
conflict has reached its peak, than during the conflict itself.  For many women, the period after 
violence ends presents new challenges and hardships. Any underlying structural violence that 
existed prior to or during conflict is likely to continue unless efforts are made to modify it.  
When war breaks down traditional social structures and men leave home to fight, women have 
consistently adopted greater responsibility.  In fact, they may feel that their circumstances are 
improved.   In Nepal, for instance, when men in left home to fight in the Maoist conflict, for 
example, their wives discovered opportunities to farm and plow their own land, and to assume 
public positions in a local district council.  These women indicated that they were grateful that 
they no longer suffered domestic abuse that dominated their marriages.22  A similar trend 
occurred in the U.S. during WWII as Rosie the Riveter called upon women to contribute 
publically to the war effort by working outside the home.  For some women, the end of conflict 
brings a return to the expected gender roles, and even retribution for women who have defied 
gender stereotypes. Transitional justice attempts to bring society back to “normal,” and in doing 
so, may reassert patriarchy privately, while re-ordering the public sphere.23  
 Breaking down the theoretical wall between the “pre” and the “post” is a useful exercise 
from multiple scholarly perspectives.  Legal scholars who promote an “Ordinary Justice” 
approach to transitional justice also advance the proposition that the pre/post dichotomy of 
transitional justice is a false one.24  This theory undermines any predictions of an idealist “peace” 
that transitional justice may bring.  Because there are regular periods of social division and 
transition even in established democracies, these theorists attempt to explode the notion that 
transitional justice is a “distinctive topic presenting distinctive set of moral and justice 
dilemmas.”25 Though this critique is not explicitly feminist, it buttresses the gender-oriented 
argument that adherence to this false dichotomy may produce unrealistic expectations and 
dangerous side effects within a transitional regime.  
Although legal scholars tend to dominate the filed of transitional justice actors, important 
findings of other disciplines can be incorporated as well to promote a more gender aware 
transitional justice schema.  Anthropologist Chris Coulter indicates that many of the international 
organizations and NGOs that implement post-conflict transitional justice mechanisms operate 
from a human rights framework described in legalistic language.26  This framework, however, 
may not be accustomed to in-depth examination of societal or cultural systems of meaning.  
Other disciplines, such as anthropology and sociology, might be better suited to this task, as they 
are specifically dedicated to understanding the complexity of social processes.  Interdisciplinary 
work, both among theorists and on the ground, may lead to fruitful collaboration that avoids 
some of the pitfalls of a purely rights-based framework as typified by a legal approach.  
                                                
22 Rita Manchanda, Ambivalent Gains in South Asian Conflicts, in THE AFTERMATH: WOMEN IN POST-CONFLICT 
TRANSFORMATION 99, 117 (Sheila Meintjes, Anu Pillay & Meredeth Turshen, ed., 2001). 
23 Ní Aoláin supra note 11; see also Megan MacKenzie, Securitization and Desecuritization: Female Soldiers and 
the Reconstruction of Women in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone, 18 Security Studies, 241-261, 2009 whose 
anthropological research with Sierra Leonean female combatants indicated that most women felt more constrained 
in their social and political choices after the conflict was over than they had during conflict.  
24 See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
761 (2004); see also Bell & O’Rourke supra note 10 at 13 (evaluating the relevance of other theories of transitional 
justice from a feminist perspective).  
25 Id. at 763-764. 
26 Coulter, supra note 17 at 8. 
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 Another concern that arises in considering the position of women within transitional 
justice programs is the tendency to assume that all women share the same needs and benefit from 
the same solutions.  This tendency has been described as “essentializing” women, who are then 
grouped as a homogeneous category in order to meet their needs post-conflict.27   This is 
problematic due to its negation of a multi-layered, diverse experience for women within conflict.  
The debate surrounding essentialization presents the paradox of whether it is preferable to 
specifically protect women’s needs and risk marginalizing them (“side-streaming” women’s 
issues), or, whether it is better to incorporate a consideration of gender into general human rights 
norms and all elements of transitional justice (“gender mainstreaming”).28  Side-streaming 
relegates women’s issues to the category of “women’s rights,” and separates them from “human 
rights,” implying that women are excluded from the latter category. In this scenario, because 
women are distinguished, conceptually the term “human” may become equated with “male.” 
Gender mainstreaming, according to Hilary Charlesworth, is at once, “too broad and too 
narrow.”29  It is too narrow because it neglects the distinct struggles that men and women face in 
and after conflict.  It is too broad because it descends into rhetoric of interrogating power 
imbalances between the genders, but may not have much effect in the field without a specific 
prescription for implementation.30  
 The diversity of female experience is also underrepresented in many treaties and 
transitional justice implementing measures that explicitly attempt to include women. Security 
Council Resolution 1325 urges that states “increase representation of women in all decision-
making levels in national, regional and international institutions for the prevention, management 
and resolution of conflict.”31  Although inclusion of women is an important starting point, this 
approach risks the assumption that the inclusion of a woman in decision-making will represent 
“women’s issues,” when perhaps a highly-educated upper class white woman may have a vastly 
different experience than, for example, a poor, illiterate, indigenous woman. This approach, 
derisively referred to as the “add women and stir” solution, is not enough of a change to 
ameliorate sexism.32  It risks falling into the conceptual trap of essentializing the ‘woman’ who is 
absent,33 assuming that any woman can represent all women.  Inclusion of women as proposed 
by S.C. Res. 1325 is no guarantee that the interests of all women will be represented. 
 
B) Public / Private Dichotomies in Transitional Justice  
 Feminist critiques of mainstream transitional justice draw on a traditional feminist 
analysis of the public and private dichotomy between men’s space and women’s space.34  
Transitional justice mechanisms tend to focus on how rights have been abused publicly, rather 
                                                
27 Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric, in Feminist Legal Studies, Critical Concepts in Law (p163-
203) edited by Joanne Conaghan, (2009). 
28 Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human Rights in the United 
Nations, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2005). 
29 Id. 
30 Julie Mertus, Improving the status of Women in the Wake of War: Overcoming Structural Obstacles, 41 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 541 (2003). 
31 United Nations Security Council supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
32 Hilary Charlesworth, The Hidden Gender of International Law, 16 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 93 (2002). 
33 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Eilish Rooney, Underenforcement and Intersectionality: Gendered Aspects of Transition 
for Women, INT’L. J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 3,2 pp. 338-354 (2007). 
34 See generally CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT, 1988.  Pateman describes the traditional societal 
breakdown of men and women’s roles in which men dominate the public sphere of work outside the home, and 
women dominate the private sphere of running the household and child-rearing .  
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than privately.  Reconciliation is approached in a very public manner, whether through trials, 
truth commissions or amnesty hearings. Disarmament measures in transitional justice entail 
removing weapons from the public sphere, yet there is often no public condemnation of violence 
or weapons in the private realm.35    
One area in which the dichotomy between public and private is particularly striking is in 
the realm of sexual violence against women.  Until the end of the twentieth century, most human 
rights bodies largely ignored sexual violence against women, despite the ubiquity of rape and 
other sexual violence especially during times of war.  During times of political crisis, women’s 
bodies are often transformed into battlegrounds for competing ideologies.36  Opponents may 
target women’s bodies for attack, demonstrating military strength through a capacity to violate 
the mothers, sisters, wives or daughters of their opponents.  In addition, women are generally 
disproportionately affected by conflict.37  They bear the burden of conflict when they are the 
heads of displaced families, when they lose loved ones who may also be a source of financial 
support, or when they are directly targeted as victims of violence in conflict.38 
 As various human rights instruments were adopted over the last century, the problem of 
violence against women remained unaddressed until relatively recently.  The Convention for the 
Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)39, adopted in 1979, does 
not address violence against women, but instead focused on issues of discrimination and 
equality.  The issue did not gain prominence until international networks of feminists demanded 
an end to impunity for violations of sexual violence during times of war.40  Women’s groups 
from the global north and the global south alike coalesced around this mission,41 and women’s 
rights advocates began to promote the application of a human rights methodology (focusing on 
civil and political rights) onto the issue of sexual violence.42  In 1995 the UN Conference on 
Women in Beijing declared violence against women to be one of the convention’s dominant 
issues of concern.43 This cursory historical review of the rise of importance of violence against 
women demonstrates just how radical these demands were at the time.  The increase of the 
attention paid to sexual violence against women was a sea change in the spectrum of human 
rights and huge triumph for women’s rights advocates internationally.  
 Following this hard-fought feminist victory, some of the subsequent generation of 
feminist theorists have rejected the categorization of sexual violence as the singular human rights 
issue facing women.   Now that human rights law recognizes violence against women as a major 
rights-category, these theorists stress that the human rights community must also understand that 
                                                
35 Ní Aoláin supra note 8.  
36 Kelly D. Askin, The Quest for Post-Conflict Gender Justice, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 509 (2003).  
37 Id.   
38 Askin supra note 23. 
39 Convention for the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, UN Doc. 
A/34/46 (1980).  
40 The issue of violence against women was first publicly discussed in an international forum in 1976 at the First 
International Tribune on Crimes Against Women in Brussels. See Keck & Sikkink supra note 3, at 168-169. 
41 Elisabeth Friedman, Women’s Human Rights: The Emergence of a Movement, in WOMEN AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
AN AGENDA FOR CHANGE, 24, 24 (Julie Peters & Andres Wolper ed., 1994). 
42 Charlotte Bunch, Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Revision of Human 0Rights,12 HUMAN RIGHTS 
QUARTERLY 486, 490 (1990). 
43 The rise of this concern internationally is also reflected in the adoption of the UN General Assembly Declaration 
on the Elimination of Violence against Women and the Organization of American States adoption of the Inter-
American convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, both of which 
occurred in 1994. 
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this is not the sole means by which women suffer abuse during times of armed conflict.44  
Certainly, conflict-related sexual violence continues to be an enormous problem facing women, 
yet the nearly-singular focus on this concern may have the effect of crowding out private sexual 
violence.  It may also marginalize socioeconomic issues, such as access to health care, or 
gendered aspects of displacement, which some women may find has more of a daily influence on 
their lives.  Sexual violence, when it is perpetrated as a method of public political violence, is 
chastised, yet private sexual abuse is left untouched by transitional mechanisms.45  This trend 
risks ghettoizing domestic sexual abuse into a separate realm, unrelated to sexual violence that 
occurs publicly.  Additionally, the dominance of sexual violence within transitional justice 
mechanisms may reflect an inherent bias of the transitional justice and human rights worlds 
toward addressing political and human rights as opposed to social and economic rights.46  Yet it 
is difficult to establish a “third-world consensus” regarding which issues are of primary import to 
women in the developing world.47   As futile and useless as it might be to create a hierarchy of 
abuses that women experience, if nothing else, these highly divergent perspectives serve as 
reminders that no uniformity of experience can be assumed among women in conflict.  
 It is important to acknowledge that huge leaps forward have been made with regard to 
international recognition of sexual violence, most prominently through UN Security Council 
Resolution 1325,48 which recognizes the disproportionate impact of war on women.  Despite the 
significance of this resolution, it falls vulnerable to the criticism that its focus on sexual violence 
neglects other essential economic and social needs that women and communities during conflict 
may view as more pressing concerns.49  
 The public / private dichotomy is similarly problematic with regard to the implications of 
public testimony during mechanisms such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions.50  Many 
public truth commissions encourage female victims to testify about the crime of sexual violence 
they have suffered.  Yet the men and women of traditional societies may indeed ostracize or 
reject women who have been raped, and although it may be acceptable for these women to 
discuss sexual violence at a truth commission, it is not always acceptable once they return to 
their families in the private sphere.   Ironically, TRCs may have the effect of exacerbating social 
stigma directed at a rape victim.  As Fionnuala Ní Aoláin explains, “the forms of accountability 
sought in the post-conflict/post-regime environment reflect the gender biases that manifest in the 
prior context.”51  Although a post-conflict regime may attempt to overcome a societal bias 
directed at women who have experienced sexual violation, occasionally the method that utilized 
to accomplish this goal may only reinforce the pre-conflict gender bias. 
 The public nature of truth commissions may result in exclusions of women’s experiences 
that reflect a longstanding human rights hierarchy of privileging the more “public” political and 
                                                
44 Nesiah supra note 7. 
45 Bell & O’Rourke supra note 11. 
46 Id.  
47 See Nesiah supra note 7 (referencing Afghan women who were interviewed about the effects of sexual violence 
and who preferred to discuss challenges of feeding their families); but see Sikkink supra note 3 (referencing 
interviews with poor women in rural India who stated that the one thing that could improve their lives was an end to 
domestic abuse). 
48 40 S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (October 21, 2000). 
49 Ni Auloun supra note 8. 
50 See Fiona C. Ross, Bearing Witness: Women and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, 2003 
for a detailed assessment of how a focus on apartheid had the effect of eclipsing women’s experiences and silencing 
important components of their experiences; See also, Ní Aoláin & Turner supra note 14;  
51 Ní Aoláin supra note 11, at 830-831.  
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civil rights over “private” economic and social rights.  Research demonstrates that some women 
have been frustrated with their experiences testifying in such settings.52   Women explain that 
although they were asked repeatedly to testify about public crimes including sexual violence, the 
abuses that most dramatically affected their lives were those that occurred in the private sphere, 
such as domestic violence, the loss of loved ones, displacement, or conflict-induced poverty.  
Additionally, logistics of participating in a commission may preclude women’s involvement; the 
simple act of traveling to testify may be difficult for a woman who cares for children.  The 
predominance of the public sphere in transitional justice efforts, therefore, may sideline women’s 
accounts of injustice.  
 
C) False dichotomy between Victims and Perpetrators   
 Transitional justice mechanisms may operate based on a model of victims and 
perpetrators that assumes women to be passive victims a priori, rather than actors.53  This is 
problematic because, while women’s human rights violations should not be ignored, the equation 
of female identity as a victim denies women a broader and more nuanced role within society.  
Transitional justice seeks accountability for the (usually) female victims of this sexual violence, 
positing women in the pre-conflict role of victim, and in the post-conflict role of victim to be 
compensated or avenged.  This dynamic isolates women’s experiences and denies them the 
multiple subject positions that they may occupy in reality – a woman may have been raped, but 
perhaps she prioritizes (and takes pride in) her role head of a household caring for several 
children.  This tendency to equate women and victims reinforces a binary relationship: if women 
are victims, men are perpetrators.  This positioning denies men a broader and more nuanced 
spectrum of roles that they may occupy in a conflict or post-conflict setting; they too may also be 
victims of human rights abuse.   
 Women occupy multiple and varied roles within conflicts across the globe:  they are 
human rights advocates, politicians, judges, fighters, genociadares, victims, pawns, mothers and 
prosecutors.54  Whether motivated by idealism, racism, fear, or other impetuses, in these roles 
women have occasionally demonstrated a capacity for violence, and the response of the 
international human rights community represents a simultaneous discomfort and fascination with 
these cases.  Although women in numerous armed struggles women have taken up arms, 
women’s involvement as combatants tends to be ignored by the press and by human rights 
analyses.  Public discomfort with unexpected women’s roles is perhaps most strikingly 
demonstrated by the international attention paid to Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, the former Minister 
of Family and Women’s Affairs of Rwanda who has been charged with rape as a crime against 
humanity at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.55  Nyiramashuhuko was most 
notoriously accused of inciting and overseeing the mass rape of the women of the town of Butare 
                                                
52 Id. 
53 Nesiah supra note 10. See also Chris Coulter, Feminist Review, Female Fighters in the Sierra Leone War: 
Challenging the Assumptions? at 66, (2008).  Coulter is just one example of an anthropologist who also challenges 
these presumptions.  She explains: “The oppositional concepts of victim and perpetrator, and the attached notion of 
victims having no agency, are so all-pervasive in humanitarian discourse that they are difficult to completely avoid.”  
 
54 WOMEN WAGING PEACE & THE COMISION COLOMBIANA DE JURISITAS, COLOMBIA, PREPARING FOR PEACE: THE 
CRITICAL ROLE OF WOMEN IN COLOMBIA (2004).  
55 Peter Landesman, The Minister of Rape: How Could a Woman Incite Rwanda's Sex-Crime 
Genocide?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 15, 2002, at 82; see also Askin supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined.. 
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in 1994.  Presumably because the charges against her were rare, her case received a 
disproportionate level of attention compared to the dozens of men in the Rwandan government 
who bore similar levels of responsibility for promoting the systematic rape, torture and murder of 
thousands of women.56  
 As reassessment of women’s roles within conflict becomes necessary, so to do men’s 
roles demand closer examination.57  Unsurprisingly, scholars have discovered that men 
experience conflict and gender in myriad ways; that “masculinities are not uniform and that 
power relations exist within them.”58  Men and women are both affected by conflict in ways that 
may challenge preconceived notions about how genders are supposed to behave.  Social class, 
education, and life experience may be more determinative than gender in creating options for 
individuals in conflict.  For example, a young man who is university-educated might have more 
options available to him and will be less likely to join an armed group, than his poor, uneducated 
counterpart.  
 Case studies demonstrate that men and women alike express feelings of passivity with 
regard to the nationalistic conflicts transpiring in their countries.59  Increased attention to the way 
that men experience violence and conflict further supports the proposal that young men’s 
formative experiences can influence how they relate to armed conflict.  Bosnian Serb males who 
were tried for rape and crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia describe growing up with a collective memory of Muslim oppression of 
Serbs.  Cynthia Enloe describes an interview with one prisoner who grew up understanding his 
lack of success in his professional and romantic life as a result of this Muslim oppression.   This 
young man fell into a Serbian armed group and with little apparent political consciousness, 
participated in the rape and murder of Muslim women.  Enloe suggests that he easily transposed 
his childhood feelings of victim-hood onto the conflict at hand, leading him to participate in 
these crimes.60  In Colombia as well, both young men and young women may experience a sense 
of helplessness and lack of options – described very much as a type of victim-hood – that propel 
them to take up arms.61  Depending on the situation, both men and women may identify as 
victims, perpetrators, or fall somewhere in between.   The tendency to categorize women as 
victims resorts to essentialization of women, and interestingly, feminists, in their struggle to raise 
awareness of issues facing some women, are also guilty of these over-generalizations.62  
Awareness of the complicated nuances inherent in using the term “victim” can lead to richer 
interpretation of conflict. 
   
III. Conflict, Gender and Transitional Justice in Colombia   
                                                
56 See generally Stephanie K. Wood, A Woman Scorned for the “Least Condemned” War Crime: Precedent and 
Problems with Prosecuting Rape as a Serious War Crime in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Col. J. 
Gend. & Law (2004). 
57 Hamber supra note 16. 
58 Id. at 379. 
59 See Cynthia Enloe, All the Men are in the Militias, All the Women are Victims: The politics of Masculinity and 
Femininity in Nationalist Wars, in A WOMEN AND WAR READER 50-63 (Lois Ann Lorentzen & Jennifer Turpin ed., 
1998); see also Theidon, supra note 7.   
60 Id. Enloe at 58. 
61 Theidon supra note 59. 
62 See Kapur, infra note 25 for a detailed characterization of feminist political discourses that have resorted to 
essentialization of women as victims and the problematic nature of this analysis.  Kapur challenges feminists to 
transcend equating females with the victim subject and encourages disruption of gender and cultural norms that are 
widespread.   
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 The Colombian context provides fertile ground on which to examine how the three false 
dichotomies developed above affect the nature of armed conflict.  Recognizing the intrinsic 
connection between the specific injustices of conflict and the transitional justice measures 
implemented post-conflict,63 this paper examines some of the gender-related attributes of 
Colombia’s conflict.  In particular, it highlights the role of the estimated thirty to forty percent of 
Colombia’s combatants who are female.64  Yet, the picture presented with regard to these female 
combatants is incomplete without an understanding of the ways in which gender dynamics play 
out in Colombia’s conflict and put pressures on both women and men, challenging the way in 
which both genders are involved in and affected by conflict.  I focus on the conflict in Colombia 
as the primary paradigm for evaluating the relevance of gender-critical theories of transitional 
justice.  I intend to demonstrate that lessons learned with regard to the way that gender affects 
both men and women during and after conflict are applicable to multiple conflict situations 
worldwide, including those in which there are no female combatants.    
  I first offer a brief synopsis of the war in Colombia and the participation of women as 
fighters.  I then examine the participation of Colombian women in light of the three false 
dichotomies described above which a gender-oriented perspective can reveal.  The Colombian 
context demonstrates how these trends affect the development of conflict, and further, how they 
might be treated in post-conflict era.  I argue that the very existence of female combatants 
challenges some of our traditional conceptions about gender and armed conflict. 
 
A) Overview of the Colombian Conflict 
 Colombia’s armed conflict has lasted longer than any other in the Western Hemisphere.  
It has internally displaced nearly 4 million people, second only to the conflict in the Sudan.65  
During much of this time, the conflict has caused the deaths of over 700 civilians each month.66   
 The backdrop of the current conflict was a period called La Violencia (1948-1953) when 
two political parties competed for political supremacy.  They agreed upon a power-sharing 
government in 1958 that placated the political majority, yet did not include the ultra-left wing 
communist factions.  The exclusion of these factions sparked the rise of leftist guerilla groups, 
including the most prominent, the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia) and 
the ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional).  The FARC advocates for social protection for lower 
classes, agricultural reform, and local autonomy.  FARC promotes its mission through guerilla 
warfare consisting of conquest of territory, kidnappings, and occasional direct combat with 
government troops. In response to a perceived incapacity or unwillingness of the government to 
                                                
63 A country’s choice of transitional justice mechanisms are often directly informed by the type of injustice endemic 
to a particular conflict, and by the societal processes that lead to conflict in the first place. See Teitel, supra note 9, 
(indicating “what is deemed just (in a transitional justice context) is contingent on and informed by prior 
injustices”). 
64 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, YOU’LL LEARN NOT TO CRY: CHILD COMBATANTS IN COLOMBIA, September 2003 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/colombia0903/index.htm. Human Rights Watch indicates that it is not able to 
guarantee accuracy of the figures offered by any of their sources, as there is no precise data on the numbers of 
females and children involved in conflict in Colombia. 




66 Marc Chernick, Negotiating Peace amid Multiple Forms of Violence: The Protracted Search for a Settlement to 
the Armed Conflicts in Colombia, in COMPARATIVE PEACE PROCESSES IN LATIN AMERICA 159, 196 (Cynthia J. 
Arnson ed., 1999). 
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protect its citizens adequately, various paramilitary groups formed, which have sporadically 
benefited from state sponsorship.  When the various paramilitary groups joined forces in 1997 
under the umbrella group of the AUC (Auto-Defensas Unidas de Colombia), they were already 
notorious for rampant violations of human rights and financially dependent on narco-trafficking.  
Since the mid-1980’s the FARC has also supported its revolutionary efforts with revenue from 
narcotics sales.  
 Several Colombian administrations have attempted to negotiate peace deals with these 
armed groups. Most notably, former President Andres Pastrana ceded a large territory of land to 
the FARC in 1998, yet failed to negotiate a settlement. Current President Alvaro Uribe has taken 
a hard line with the FARC and refused to negotiate.   Uribe has, however, engaged with the 
paramilitaries, most recently in the form of the controversial Peace and Justice Law.  Under this 
law the AUC officially demobilized, though some paramilitaries still remain active.  
 
B) Women as Combatants in Colombia 
 All armed political groups in Colombia have utilized female fighters.67  Although the 
paramilitaries do include some women among their ranks, the guerillas are much more 
predominately female; of the FARC68, between twenty-five and fifty percent are female.69  
Although the FARC’s senior command is all men, several women have become “comandantes,” 
comparable to the rank of officer.70  The FARC actively works to recruit women to its ranks, 
highlighting its revolutionary Marxist mission; FARC’s website “invites [all women] to 
participate in our just revolutionary fight for a New Colombia with social justice, for better living 
dignity and independence.”71  There are reports of women and girls being forced to join the 
FARC, yet precise data on forced recruitment are unavailable. Anecdotal evidence, interviews, 
and anthropological research indicates that the majority of women and girls make a conscious 
choice to become guerillas, yet this decision is often perceived as being the best of a dismal array 
of alternatives for poor women with few options, rather than a statement of idealism.72    
 History provides several isolated examples of females bearing arms, including Joan of 
Arc and Eleanor of Aquitaine, but women who fight in combat have remained the exception 
rather than the rule.  Still, particularly in movements that have made claims to revolution, or that 
seek liberation from colonial or repressive regimes, it is not uncommon to find a high percentage 
of female participation.73  These women exemplify attempts to leave the private sphere of the 
                                                
67 Human Rights Watch supra note 64.   
68 Great discrepancy exists between the number of FARC combatants according to FARC and according to the 
government.  See Jeremy McDermott Colombia’s Rebels: A Fading Force? (February 1, 2008), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7217817.stm, (citing the Colombian government’s figures that the 2008 number 
of FARC is between six and eight thousand): see also Gary Leech, Interview with FARC Commander Raul Reyes, 
(July 12, 2007), available at http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia259.htm, 
(citing an interview with FARC commander Raul Reyes who claims to have 18,000 active members). 
69 Human Rights Watch supra note 64; see also UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women) Gender 
Profile of the Conflict in Colombia, (2004) available at: www.womenwarpeace.org  
70 Jeremy McDermott, Colombia’s Female Fighting Force, BBC News, (January 4, 2002), available at 
http://new.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1742217.stm.  
71 Keith Stanski, Terrorism, Gender and Ideology: A Case Study of Women who Join the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) in THE MAKING OF A TERRORIST: RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND ROOT CAUSES, 136-
150 (James J.F. Forest, Praeger Security International ed, 2006).  
72 Human Rights Watch supra note 59. 
73 Women have participated in irregular forces of countries including:  Colombia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Eritrea, 
Nepal, Mexico, Cuba, Sri Lanka, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Vietnam, Mozambique, Eritrea, Angola, Liberia, 
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home in which women are typically associated, and to enter the public world of armed combat.  
Many of these groups have made claims – on the surface –  to gender equality.  In Latin 
America, the legacy of female fighters is particularly glorified among the poor of the 
countryside, famously demonstrated by an  image of a Nicaraguan Sandanista toting a gun while 
breastfeeding her baby. 
 Within armed groups, the degree to which men and women achieve equality varies by 
region.  In some forces women train and fight combat missions with the men.  Despite this, it is 
invariably the women in the rebel camp who cook and clean.74  Though it may appear 
inconsistent, many of the groups that recruit women as fighters are also the worse perpetrators of 
sexual violence against civilian women.  One Congolese girl who willingly joined an armed 
group at age twelve, explained that “when the men [in the Interhamwe] were pillaging people’s 
villages, they would rape women. But at that time they wouldn’t take us with them.”75  Women 
perform as deadly fighters and assassins, but there are many contexts in which women do not 
function as equals. 
 Despite the presence of these women fighters, many human rights groups focus only on 
the victimization and targeting of women.  For instance, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR)76 identifies four central manifestations of violence that affect women 
within Colombia’s armed conflict. These manifestations are: (1) women or their families are 
direct targets of physical, psychological and sexual violence; (2) women are forcibly displaced; 
(3) women are forcibly recruited which invariably results in sexual or reproductive abuse; (4) 
women are objects of social control exerted by guerilla groups over conflict regions.   
 In addition to the IACHR, hundreds of human rights organizations have published reports 
and advocacy papers on the impact of the conflict in Colombia on women, yet very few address 
the status of the women who have fought as combatants.   In its 102-page report, the IACHR 
devotes one page to women who are forcibly or voluntarily recruited, and who then experience 
sexual abuse. The report fails to address women who join combat willingly.  Although the final 
conclusions of the human rights organizations are important, they ignore the precarious role of 
these women fighters.77  Certainly the overall number of women affected by the sexual violence 
is much larger than the number of female fighters; Amnesty International claims that between 
seventy and eighty percent of Colombian women experience sexual violence in their lives.78  
Most human rights reports include the word victim in the title, but the image of a “victim” 
wearing army fatigues and carrying an AK47 may be difficult to reconcile.  This difficult 
intersection of identities, of an individual as woman and as soldier, provides fertile ground for 
understanding conflict in Colombia.   In turn, transitional justice mechanisms that address the 
                                                                                                                                                       
South Africa, Peru, Palestinian fighters in Lebanon and Israeli-Occupied Territories. See Judith Gardam and 
Michelle Jarvis, Women and Armed Conflict: The International Response to the Beijing Platform for Action, 32 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2000); see generally, THE AFTERMATH: WOMEN IN POST-CONFLICT 
TRANSFORMATION, (Sheila Meintjes, Anu Pillay, & Meredeth Turshen ed., 2001). 
74 Sandra Jordan, Girls go to War as Colombia’s Frontline Killers, THE OBSERVER, (July 14, 2002), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jul/14/sandrajordan.theobserver.  
75  MATT HOBSON, SAVE THE CHILDREN, FORGOTTEN CASUALTIES OF WAR: GIRLS IN ARMED CONFLICT 1 (2005), at 
6. 
76 INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN THE 
ARMED CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA, Oct. 18, 2006 http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/ColombiaMujeres06eng/TOC.htm. 
77 MacKenzie, supra note 22. MacKenzie also argues that, despite the important role played by NGOs of 
highlighting conflict-related violence against women, these reports have also perpetuated the impression that women 
are victims and not actors in conflict.  
78 Amnesty International supra note 3, at 12. 
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needs of female combatants must interrogate what it means to be both a woman and a soldier in 
Colombia, and furthermore, shed light on the fact that other gender dynamics may be perilously 
ignored within post-conflict mechanisms. 
 
1) False Dichotomy between “Pre” and “Post” conflict: Sexualization of Conflict 
Violence  
 
 “Young man, are you bored?”79  
 
 These words accompany a photo of a fatigue-clothed girl, beckoning Colombian boys to 
join the army in a government-sponsored advertisement.  On the other side of the conflict, 
Colombia’s guerilla groups also solicit young men by luring them with attractive young girls.  A 
website promoting FARC displays images of young couples in fatigues, romantically involved in 
the jungles of Colombia, fighting for a radical leftist cause, seeking to liberate Colombia from a 
corrupt government.   
 Although these manipulations of sexuality can be interpreted as superficial recruiting 
tactics, I suggest that they are reflective of the larger role that gender plays within Colombian 
society and are intimately intertwined with violent conflict.  Unless transitional justice 
mechanisms explicitly take these dynamics into account, gender ideals will not change on their 
own, and may remain identical in the post-conflict era as they were during conflict itself.  
Colombian society reveals a phenomenon explained by Kimberly Theidon as “militarized 
masculinity,”80 in which a masculine identity is intrinsically connected to and dependent on 
involvement in armed conflict.  Theidon’s work describes Colombian women who explained that 
in choosing romantic partners, they seek out ‘gran hombres’ (big men) who have proven 
themselves desirable because they are successful combatants and leaders of the guerilla.  Yet it is 
both men and women who are responsible for prioritizing these values within an economy of 
war: militarized masculinity is valued not only by the men whose guns are measures of power 
and prestige, but also by women who view a relationship with one of these men as valuable 
commodities. Violence and the gender constructs that accompany it are reinforced and idealized 
in a country that is all too accustomed to war.81  
 In Colombia, women are targeted in horrific ways and are victims of physical, 
psychological, and sexual aggression.  Sexual violence in particular is utilized with the intention 
of undermining the strength of the enemy.  Women are sometimes targeted for their behavior, 
including romantic relationships with a man of a particular faction, or for refusal to obey 
proscribed social norms imposed by the group controlling the region where they live.82  
Women’s bodies are also targeted in order to attack men who are considered the enemy, as local 
custom charges men with the responsibility of protecting the sexuality of their wives, sisters, or 
daughters.  Sexual exploitation of a woman therefore, targets not only a woman but also the 
capacity of men to exert control and power within their community.  This phenomena is 
                                                
79 Id. 
80 Theidon supra note 55, at 76.  See also Coulter, supra note 17, at 14.  Coulter argues, based on her 
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81 See generally Theidon supra note 55.  
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described in a report by the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against women after a visit to 
Colombia: 
Perhaps more than the honor of the victim, it is the perceived honor of the enemy that is 
targeted in the perpetration of sexual violence against women; it is seen and often 
experienced as a means of humiliating the opposition. Sexual violence against women is 
meant to demonstrate victory over the men of the other group who have failed  to protect 
their women. It is a message of castration and emasculation of the enemy group. It is a 
battle among men fought over the bodies of women.83   
 
 The behavior of guerillas as they exert their influence over new regions of the country 
also demonstrates that relevance of sex and gender is not limited to acute physical sexual 
violence against women. Territorial conquest of an area by guerillas is generally accompanied by 
the exertion of strict social control over the local population.84  Guerillas often place particular 
emphasis on adherence to antiquated, and or formal gender roles.  Men are prohibited from 
wearing long hair or earrings.  Women are required to dress modestly, are forbidden from baring 
their legs or stomachs, and are banned from sexual relationships outside of marriage.  
Homosexuality and prostitution are deemed irreconcilable with traditional social structure and 
are banned.  Women are forbidden from using birth control or from having abortions.85  These 
rigid social controls reflect gender roles as they “should” be, and are in accordance with an 
idealized vision of “la patria” (the fatherland) as promulgated by the guerillas.  They do not view 
their policy of recruiting women combatants as being internally inconsistent with these national 
ideals, although these social norms are in direct opposition to the sexual and social values lived 
out by the combatants in their daily lives. Gendered social controls allow the guerillas (men or 
women) to demonstrate that it is they, and not the men of a community, who exert control over 
the population of a newly conquered area.   
 Unfortunately, oftentimes an end to conflict does not bring an end to violence against 
women.  In Colombia, one study revealed that in domestic violence was endemic in seven out of 
ten households headed by a reintegrated combatant.86  This post-conflict increase in domestic 
violence is a phenomena that occurs throughout the world, as was reported in a 2002 UNIFEM 
study on the relationship between women and conflict.87  In Cambodia, one woman stated, “Men 
who have witnessed and perpetrated violence during war seem to continually act violently to 
their families.  My husband was a Khmer Rouge soldier. I think this has made him broken in 
some important human way.”88  Research reflects that individuals who are trained as soldiers to 
use violence as their primary means of interacting with the world often have difficulty interacting 
with their families in ways that do not involve violence.  Without concrete efforts to modify the 
ways in which ex-combatants conceptualize sexuality and violence, the training and ideology 
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about gender roles that men and women receive during wartime will endure in the post-conflict 
era.   
 
2) Female Combatants: Transitioning between the public and private 
 Woefully little research has been published on why women join armed combat groups.89  
The research that is available indicates that feminism was definitely an influence in many cases, 
primarily because it caused some disintegration of gendered societal barriers and lessened male 
opposition to females in combat. 
 Additional explanations for why Colombian women join combat include the desire to join 
a partner, to avenge past crimes, or to escape from domestic violence.90 Membership is 
sometimes also due to fear of guerillas or to a scarcity of better options for survival.  Some 
women indicate that joining the guerilla can be empowering, as it offers the promise of 
meaningful work and an adventurous lifestyle that are not available in traditional civilian life.91  
According to the International Labor Organization, women in Liberia joined to protect 
themselves from murder or rape, or to prove their equality with males.  All the research reiterates 
limited options: “for many … females, becoming a soldier was a matter of kill or be killed.”92  In 
Colombia, a former girl combatants recalled being recruited by the FARC: “Well, then every 
time he came to our house he asked us whether we would go [to join the movement]. We decided 
to go because he said it would give us an education that staying at home wouldn’t.  So we left.”93  
 Whether women remain at home with their families or join the combatants, their sexual 
lives are often controlled within a militarized, patriarchal society.  As a civilian, a woman is 
subject to the threat of rape and social sexual controls if guerillas occupy her home.  Women 
who become combatants are subject to a similarly rigid control over their sexual activity, yet this 
type of control contrasts sharply with that exerted over civilians.  Sexual activity with other 
soldiers is encouraged, yet regulated by top commanders who must grant permission for 
overnight visits between partners.  Protocol demands adherence to birth control methods; some 
women report that a female’s orientation into a combat unit includes mandatory insertion of 
Norplant or IUDs, and women who become pregnant are often forced to abort.94   One woman 
reported that she visited a FARC nurse to monitor her pregnancy and learned later that her fetus 
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had been aborted.95  The refusal to abort a pregnancy is one of the most common explanations 
that demobilized women offer for their decision to abandon the guerillas.   Interviews with 
demobilized women whose ideals led them to join the movement indicated that they often left 
disillusioned.96  If women already have children prior to joining the guerilla, they are generally 
prohibited from maintaining contact with them, and essentially must decide between having a 
family or fighting.97  These experiences of women in combat units tend to indicate that although 
it appears that they have crossed a barrier between the realm of the public and of the private, that 
barrier may only have been temporarily crossed.  A strong societal division between public and 
private still exists. 
 
3) Victims and Perpetrators: Why Colombians become Combatants 
 As the presence of female combatants undermines the concept of women as purely 
victims, it also demands a redefinition of what it means to be a victim at all.  If a person joins an 
armed fighting group, but is coerced into joining, is she a victim or a perpetrator?  What of an 
individual who willingly joins an armed group, but does so because she knows that she has no 
other opportunities to support herself at home?  These queries apply equally to men and to 
women; just as women cannot be classified unilaterally as victims, men’s roles within conflict 
also demand greater interrogation.98  
 Colombia’s military conflict has forced young girls and young men into difficult 
situations with limited options.  Both men and women cite similar reasons for voluntarily joining 
armed groups:  lack of education, lack of opportunity, dedication to political cause, interest in 
mystique and intrigue of a life dedicated to revolutionary struggle.99  Human Rights Watch 
indicates that the choice to join the irregular military forces is more an indication of dismal life 
choices for young Colombians than a reflection of dedication to revolutionary ideals.100  In 
addition to these considerations, it is notable that sixty-five percent of those who enter are minors 
at the time that they join.  Former soldiers reflect that they were highly impressionable when 
they joined and didn’t fully understand the choices that they made.101  Upon demobilizing, many 
indicate that they deserted because they were tired of fighting and tired of the lifestyle. Some 
expressed bitterness and a sense of “engaño,” a Spanish term indicating that one feels he has 
been duped and consequently, taken advantage of.  Foot soldiers complain that commanders only 
care about personal financial gain associated with the struggle, and that young recruits are 
exploited to do the dirty work.   
 In addition to being victims of economic and political circumstances that may push them 
to join armed groups, young people are subjected to dominant gender constructs of militarized 
society in which expectations for male and female behavior have developed.102  When they lack 
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traditional civilian symbols of success (such as education, housing, material goods, legal 
income), men may seek out other ways to express and establish their masculinity through non-
traditional means.  Additionally, a young man without access to traditional capital might use his 
physical body as the only capital available to him, resulting in his joining the guerilla.103  For a 
young Colombian man with few other options, taking up arms may be the only way of proving 
himself in a society in which the economy is an economy of war. 
 Conversations with Colombia’s demilitarized combatants reveal the highly gendered 
motivations behind men’s decision to take up arms.   Kimberly Theidon interviewed young men 
who explained that joining the paramilitaries “allowed them to ‘feel like a big man in the streets 
of their barrios,’ to ‘go out with the prettiest young women,’ and to ‘dress well,’ privileges they 
insist would not have been possible if they weren’t carrying a gun."104  Cultural ideas of 
masculinity and femininity within the context of war mutually reinforce one another in 
Colombia, as they do in other war zones.105   
 The highly gendered experiences of women and men undermine mainstream transitional 
justice’s inclination to group individuals as victims or as perpetrators.  Recognizing the failings 
of the victim / perpetrator model, one alternative framework that can be used to understand the 
various roles at play in these conflicts is one that Peruvian peasants arrived at organically.106  In 
describing the ways in which their lives had been forever changed by the guerilla warfare that 
had ravaged the countryside, they referred to themselves as “los aftectados,” or, “those who have 
been affected.”107 This term encompasses the diversity of experiences within an entire rural 
community, and was more suitable than simply using the word “victim” for those who were 
killed, raped or displaced.  Some people joined the guerilla, some were terrorized by the guerilla, 
some were related to victims or to combatants, but all were affected by the political turmoil that 
dominated their lives.    
 The influence that gender has on men as well as on women should be an integral part of 
any transitional justice strategy in Colombia.  Transitional justice does more than seek justice for 
human rights abuses of the past.  It necessarily implicates the social elements, actors and norms 
that brought about the violations in the first place. Therefore, transitional justice has the potential 
to reconstruct a society, which has necessary implications for gender roles.108  Social norms 
equating masculinity with military power need to be considered in a society that attempts to 
review how it arrived at its current level of abuse and violence.  Normative gender constructs of 
a militarized society in conflict, like Colombia’s, may position men and women uniquely 
depending on their gender, but both groups are victimized and left with few options as a result of 
the limitations of these roles.   
 
IV. Effects of Transitional Justice on Colombian Female Combatants  
 As early as 1953 Colombian administrations began to make efforts to resolve conflict and 
to pursue peace with various armed groups, first with the left-wing guerillas and later with the 
right-wing paramilitaries.  All have grappled to find the appropriate balance between achieving a 
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peaceful resolution and a just one.109  After the multiple failures to secure peace with the 
guerillas suffered by previous administrations, President Uribe was elected on the promise of 
taking a hard-line approach to the FARC.  Beginning in 2002, Uribe’s government began 
negotiations with the paramilitaries.  This process lead to the adoption of the Peace and Justice 
Law, which was approved by the Colombian Congress in 2005 as Law 975.110  This law 
represents an attempt to implement transitional justice mechanisms in a situation that, because 
the fighting still continues, is actually a “pre-post conflict”111 context.  
 The Peace and Justice Law lays out the parameters of Colombia’s Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program for paramilitaries.  DDR has been attempted 
throughout the world in post-conflict settings and aims to facilitate the decentralization and 
disbanding the members of armed groups and to enable ex-combatants to transition back into 
society through achieving economic and social self-sufficiency.112  Law 975’s version of DDR 
offers most rank-and-file combatants the promise of amnesty and a comprehensive reintegration 
package in return for laying down their weapons; under the law paramilitary leaders who have 
committed exceptional crimes are prosecuted at special courts and are promised drastically 
reduced sentences in exchange for full disclosure of crimes.113 This law has come under attack 
from human rights groups who argue that it guarantees impunity for some of the worst human 
rights offenders because testimonies are not sufficiently transparent to the public, too many 
criminals are offered amnesty, and because it undermines the victims’ rights to truth, justice and 
reparation.114   
 It is beyond the scope of this paper to present an exhaustive review of the Justice and 
Peace Law and its capacity for transitional justice.  Yet an examination of the ways in which this 
law has failed to account for female combatants in Colombia reveals some of the deficiencies 
with regard to considering gender in this strategy.  Thus far, in Colombia no agreement has been 
signed with the FARC, and therefore the lessons learned in Colombia have only been applicable 
thus far to small numbers of women from the paramilitaries. Female combatants have abandoned 
the FARC, yet as of now, there is no officially mandated program for them as part of Colombian 
law.   Moving forward, an analysis of the successes and failures of DDR and Transitional justice 
programs with regard to gender will be crucial in light of the many ways that gender and conflict 
intersect in Colombia.  Additionally, post-conflict strategies that regard gender dynamics is 
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critical because of the high number of women in the FARC guerilla forces who have yet to 
demobilize. A gender-oriented strategy that anticipates the needs of both women and men may 
indeed be persuasive in convincing combatants that they have the support they need in order to 
demobilize.  
 The text of the Justice and Peace Law, for example, reflects a gender mainstreaming 
approach.  In particular, Article 41 provides general guidance that women’s issues should be 
considered in implementation of the law.115  The law also mandates creation of a National 
Commission of Reparation and Reconciliation, which is to consist of five individuals, of whom 
at least two must be women.116  Both of these attempts to integrate a gender into elements of the 
law reflect consideration that women may be overlooked if not specifically addressed.  Yet these 
articles provide perfect example of Hilary Charlesworth’s critique that this approach is at once 
“too broad and too narrow.”117  The law specifies that women should be included on a national 
commission, yet offers no indication of how exactly this should occur.  It also risks placing these 
women in the position of being expected to speak on behalf of all women. 
 The Justice and Peace Law also mandates a demobilization process for combatants.  
According to the law, combatants may demobilize either as individuals or as a collective group 
of fighters.  There are no specific accommodations for female fighters.118  According to 
government statistics, 41,000 paramilitaries that have demobilized thus far.  Of these, 31,000 did 
so collectively (through a group’s agreement with the government), and six percent of the 
collective demobilizations were females.  10,000 paramilitaries demobilized individually, and 
ten percent of the individual demobilizations were female.119  These numbers reflect that 
thousands of paramilitary women have demobilized with no gender-specific support. 
 In Colombia women who have demobilized under the Justice and Peace Law face 
numerous problems that are not faced by male demobilized combatants.120   Women who 
demobilize come from thirty-one of Colombia’s thirty-two departments, and generally come 
from small towns in rural areas, yet eighty-five percent chose to resettle in the anonymity of 
large urban areas.121  Although a return to their home regions and families might provide 
substantial economic and social support, many of these women resettle far from their families to 
avoid reprisals of former fellow combatants whom they left behind in the ranks.   Demobilization 
programs with no special accommodation for women without support systems are destined to fail 
these women, many of whom face challenges finding employment as women, particularly if they 
have child-caring duties as well.  
 Although the attitude toward sexual activity between combatants varies, some women 
invariably become pregnant while they are enlisted.  This causes some Colombian women to 
demobilize individually, as they are not permitted to have children and would otherwise be 
forced to abort.  Once they have demobilized and are pregnant or accompanied by small 
children, they require neo-natal or child-care.   Without special attention to these considerations, 
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women may enter shelters alongside the same men with whom they served, or who may have 
sexually violated them. The DDR process provides no services for these young, single, displaced 
mothers who lack other support networks.   
Women ex-fighters face similar struggles globally due to specific needs and complicated 
personal situations that men do not encounter.  Some Ugandan girls fought, became pregnant, 
and abandoned their units all before reaching their twelfth birthdays.  These girls must care for 
babies, often with no family support.  For these adolescents, for example, the requirement placed 
on ex-combatants to attend school as a pre-condition for participation in a DDR program is 
unimaginable due to other demands on their time.122   
 Another difficulty of the post-conflict reconstruction era for female combatants is that in 
taking up arms in a violent conflict, often they have broken cultural stereotypes regarding 
women’s behavior.  Once a woman makes this departure from the private sphere to the public 
one, it may be difficult for her to remain there once the fighting is over.  Women who fight as 
combatants have shattered their home communities’ perceptions of gender roles, and are often 
likely to face discrimination as a result and are not accepted within much of traditional society.  
 Because the DDR process began relatively recently, detailed empirical research on 
Colombian female combatants’ responses to demobilization is lacking.  Although societal 
constructs regarding gender vary greatly across the globe, resistance to shifting norms regarding 
women’s roles in society is a theme that arises in most contexts. Despite the instrumental 
contribution of women as fighters, the men in many liberation movements expect women to 
maintain the cultural and familial elements of society.  Their “natural” feminine roles are 
romanticized: as mothers, supporters of their men, or “keepers of the hearth.”123  
 One anthropological study that examined the experience of female fighters from 
Mozambique who participated in the FRELIMO independence movement is particularly useful 
because it was conducted two decades after women put down their arms.124 Although a 
demobilization process occurred, it took no special consideration of female combatants and the 
difficulties that face them as they reintegrated into a patriarchal society after assuming 
traditionally “male” roles.  During combat, when women began to frequently appear with guns 
slung over their shoulders, the elders of villages complained to guerilla leaders that this 
presented “an unacceptable challenge to ‘traditional’ societal relationships.”125  Women 
explained that after the war ended, they felt abandoned by the movement.  Any pretense of 
gender equality was apparently only due to the exigencies of wartime, and these women were 
ultimately socially ostracized.126  Even the guerilla men with whom they had fought refused to 
view them as equals; one ex-combatant was told by a former lover that she was too “feisty and 
independent”127 to continue a relationship, reflecting that patriarchy and sexism remained 
endemic to the private sphere, even if their temporary upheaval in the public sphere led to the 
country’s liberation.  
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 Liberian women who took up arms also struggled with re-integration after abandoning 
traditional roles as women.128  One ex-general, who fought as part of a group of insurgents 
against Charles Taylor’s government still sees herself as responsible for her female soldiers.  
Amidst uncertainty about what DDR programs entailed, these women expressed hesitance to 
enroll.  They also expressed great frustration with their society. Many had joined combat because 
it appeared to be a means to counter oppression of women and to flaunt gender roles.  To their 
disappointment, they have discovered that sexism in their society was more firmly entrenched 
than they had realized.  One woman who led a forty-woman unit explained, "We first were 
fighting men with our guns, now we have given up our guns, but we still have to fight men, this 
time with our pens. That's what I try to tell my girls now."129 
 The United Nations has made a concerted effort to address challenges facing demobilized 
female fighters.  Security Council Resolution 1325 addresses the unique needs of female and 
male ex-combatants and their dependants.130  The UN has also released several briefing papers 
on potential solutions to some of these problems, but they continue to be endemic to the 
demobilization process in Colombia.131  Despite these UN efforts, Colombia has not made any 
specific effort to accommodate women soldiers.132    
  In addition to mandating the demobilization of combatants, the Justice and Peace Law 
also addresses compensation for victims of human rights abuses.  Broader concerns regarding the 
insufficiency of these means have already been elaborately reported on elsewhere.133  The law 
provides reparations for victims and DDR for perpetrators.  But if a woman, for example, was 
raped by a member of the paramilitaries, and then joined the guerrilla in order to seek revenge 
against her rapist, the law is not able to accommodate her experience.  It fails to consider a 
situation in which a person is simultaneously a victim and a perpetrator. 
 
V. Conceptualizing a Vision of Gender-Inclusive Transitional Justice 
 A feminist analysis of transitional justice recognizes the inherent shortcomings with 
implementing any post-conflict measures.  Any measure to rebuild a society after conflict is 
necessarily an imperfect, impossible task.134  Theoretical critiques reveal inherent flaws and 
inadequacies of the process as it is implemented in various societies.  On-the-ground 
practitioners, often distanced from theory, are faced with an imperative to act and may not have 
the time or institutional space to engage with complications in distinguishing who are the victims 
and who are perpetrators.135  This gap between theory and practice is evident, as many of the 
scholars who write about gender and transitional justice fail to answer the most difficult 
question: What might a genuinely feminist version of transitional justice look like?  I suggest 
that incorporation of a gender-critique of transitional justice hinges on sacrificing some of the 
idealism endemic to this field.  
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 The incorporation of transitional justice from below is one important method for 
addressing gender within conflict.136  This means that mechanisms are implemented not only on 
an international and domestic level, but that they are also community based.  Organizing on a 
community level can promote awareness of issues that face former soldiers, can spark public 
examination of male and female gender roles, or can inspire consideration of why families reject 
rather than support their daughters who have been raped.  In Colombia this might occur through 
supporting the numerous grassroots women’s organizations that already advocate for peace, and 
by bringing them into policy decisions at a the state and international levels.137  Turner and Ní 
Aoláin’s recommendation that any truth commission should include women of diverse 
experiences and background is a useful strategy for any transitional justice mechanism,138 in that 
inclusion of diversity of experience is essential.  
 Specific modifications should also be made with regard to the DDR process in order to 
accommodate female combatants unique needs.  The DDR program in Sierra Leone, for 
example, suffered from low participation of female combatants.  Of the 72,500 combatants that 
demobilized, only 4,751 (6.5 %) were women.  It is unknown exactly how many women were 
fighters, yet it is widely accepted that only a small percentage of female fighters were 
demobilized.139   Although this DDR process was widely regarded as a success by the UN and as 
a model for future DDR programs, the low numbers of female participation indicates that the 
program may have failed many of its intended beneficiaries.  Improvements for other future 
programs might include: specific programs aimed at supporting women in the long term, 
programming that recognizes that demobilized women may mother children toward whom they 
have ambivalent feelings because of the identity of father; elimination of gender stereotyping in 
skill and job training in DDR programs; insurance of women’s health and childcare facilities; 
and recognition that women may not have access to financial institutions (if money is distributed 
in the DDR process).  In Colombia, especially considering the high number of women who have 
yet to demobilize from the FARC, changes such as these could radically improve women’s 
chances for self-sufficiency after disarming, and could incentivize demobilization among 
women. 
 It is crucial that domestic and international actors acknowledge the specificity of each 
post-conflict context, and that domestic political challenges unique to each context can 
complicate transitional justice measures.  For example, the Colombian Congress debated 
numerous approaches to transitional justice, each of which was located in a different spot along 
the spectrum of the “peace versus justice” debate.140  One means to address competing needs of 
different sectors might include parallel structures of transitional justice mechanisms.  For 
example, truth commissions can be implemented side-by-side with criminal hearings, and need 
not be mutually exclusive.    
Finally, although this paper is limited to a discussion of transitional justice mechanisms 
such as trials, truth commissions and DDR programs, it is also important to consider a variety of 
alternative mediums for post-conflict reconstruction that typically fall outside the ambit of 
transitional justice.  In order to ensure that gender-related injustices and abuses within society are 
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not perpetuated as a society is rebuilt in a post-conflict era, it is crucial that societies invest in 
long-term development of rule of law and institution building from a gender-aware perspective, 
as well as implementing short-term transitional justice mechanisms with an eye toward the 
important role that gender inherently plays in conflict.  
 Had some of these mechanisms been in place, how might Colombia’s justice system have 
approached Lorena, the paramilitary assassin described at the beginning of this paper?141 Had she 
not been murdered, how should the law have accounted for her crimes?  Difficult life 
circumstances drove her to join combat, yet it is difficult to make the argument that these 
circumstances constituted duress and should exonerate her from having murdered dozens of 
people in cold blood.  Yet in Colombia, Lorena is not alone. Thousands of other women and men 
have participated in combat and committed atrocious violations of human rights, and many have 
done so because they feel they have no other choice.  Were Colombia to implicate all who bore 
some degree of guilt, the country might be faced with imprisoning entire communities of people. 
 Transitional justice mechanisms offer no ideal solution for a combatant in Lorena’s 
position, both a perpetrator of violence and also a victim of it.  When abuse has occurred, a 
country must draw the line between looking backward to seek accountability for the past, while 
simultaneously looking forward.  This demands a vision that smart, well-conceptualized 
transitions from violence to peace will prevent such atrocities from reoccurring.  As the 
challenges raised by Colombian female combatants demonstrate, gender inclusiveness is a 
crucial element if transitional justice mechanisms hope to make society more decent and just.   
In post-conflict settings, accountability should be carried out with an eye toward 
remedying basic injustices of society, rather than perpetuating them.  Practitioners and scholars 
must be cognizant of the way in which gender is instrumental to any transitional justice 
endeavors that seeks to fundamentally reshape a society where violent conflict has occurred.  
Both domestic and international actors, therefore, working in post-conflict contexts must strive to 
address gender dynamics and consider the way in which men’s and women’s proscribed roles 
may contribute to conflict.  Failing this, the endeavor of transitional justice risks reinforcing 
gendered norms that offer men and women limited options in post-conflict societies.  Despite the 
tragedies that have often occurred during conflict, an era in which transitional justice is being 
implemented provides an opportunity to transform the origins of conflict.  To engage in this 
process without considering the underlying gender dynamics that perpetuate conflict ignores 
crucial components of these societies, and undermines any aspiration of achieving either 
transition or justice for women and for men.   
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